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Abstract This paper examines the issue of compensation payments for farmers affected by
an animal disease outbreak. Recent literature has questioned the scope for the widely used
“single mechanism” of compensation payments to incentivise farmers both to undertake
costly on-farm biosecurity and to comply with disease reporting requirements. This paper
develops a simple theoretical model of the farmer’s decision environment in this situation and
uses a numerical analysis to illustrate both the potential for a range of levels of compensation
payments to achieve this dual incentivising, and how this range is affected by changes in the
parameter values of the farmer’s decision environment. The findings of the paper are used to
suggest a range of policy implications in relation to compensation payments in the UK.
Keywords Compensation payments · Animal disease · Incentivising farmers · On-farm
biosecurity · Disease reporting requirements
1 Introduction
According to the National Audit Office (NAO) report on the outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth
Disease in the UK in 2001 “Farmers received over £1.1b in compensation for animals that
were slaughtered for disease control purposes” (NAO 2002), within a total public sector cost
of over £3b. In addition, Olmstead and Rhode (2015) in their historical evaluation of animal
disease policy in the United States point out the large share of compensation (indemnity)
payments in the total cost of a range of disease eradication attempts.
Nevertheless, as argued by Olmstead and Rhode “eradication… would demand devising
incentive-compatible compensation schemes” (p. 279) which would “create incentives for
farmers to participate” (p. 283) in reporting disease outbreaks on their farms. However, such
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compensation payments to farmers have often been criticised,1 and government agencies
under pressure to reduce them. In this context Bicknell et al. (1999) report that the New
Zealand Animal Health Board’s “latest national Tb strategy” stipulates that “compensation
payments will be reduced” (p. 514) and on this basis they proceed to evaluate the impact of
eliminating compensation payments on farmer behaviour. Using “a dynamic bioeconomic
model of livestock disease control” (p. 501) they find that although “producers take a more
active role in controlling the spread of diseasewithin their herds”, in the presence of voluntary
testing for disease “the elimination of compensation leads to a decrease in testing activity” (p.
514). As a consequence, where disease notification is mandatory Bicknell et al. (1999) point
out that “the elimination of compensation payments may prompt non-compliant behaviour”
(p. 514).
Moreover, this problemof clashing incentives for on-farmbiosecurity versus reporting dis-
ease outbreaks in the context of compensation payments has been highlighted again recently
by Hennessy and Wolf (2015) who suggest that “compensation must be sufficient to ensure
early reporting but not so large as to discourage appropriate levels of biosecurity effort”
(p. 1). But in developing this argument Hennessy and Wolf (2015) then go on to cite the
analysis of Gramig et al. (2009) and on this basis reach the conclusion that “a simple one-
size-fits-all indemnity payment could not deal with both problems” (p. 9)—which is at odds
with actual disease control policy where “Animal health authorities have relied on a single
mechanism—indemnities—to facilitate both ex ante biosecurity effort and ex post reporting”
(p. 9).
However, although Hennessy and Wolf (2015) “explore the incentives that indemnities
offer”, they do so using “a direct, discursive and non-mathematical approach” (p. 2). There-
fore, this conflict between the widespread and on-going animal disease policy of using a
single incentive mechanism, compensation payments, to deliver both “appropriate levels of
biosecurity” and “ensure disease reporting” and Hennessy and Wolf’s conclusion that such
an approach “could not deal with both problems”, suggests it might be worthwhile undertak-
ing a more mathematical approach to analysing this situation, with a view to throwing more
light on the trade-off of farmer incentives associated with varying levels of compensation
payments.
Such an analysis is reported in what follows. Section 2 develops a simple model of farmer
decision-making in the presence of the threat of animal disease—and where the farmer
must make sequential decisions regarding: (i) whether to choose to undertake voluntary on-
farm biosecurity measures which are costly, but which would reduce the risk of a disease
outbreak; and (ii) whether to comply or not with the mandatory requirement to report (notify)
an outbreak of disease should it subsequently take place on the farm. It should be noted at
this point that although the choice of whether or not to report a disease outbreak fits readily
into such a binary choice format, framing the decision about investing in on-farm biosecurity
measures as a binary choice is less realistic. More specifically, farmers are likely to have a
range of biosecurity measures to choose from, with associated implications both for the cost
of implementation and for the impact on the risk of an outbreak. In addition, this specification
in effect excludes consideration of both spatial and temporal externalities in relation to disease
outbreaks. Therefore, while this simplified approach is maintained for the analysis to follow,
its implications for policy are considered in the Conclusion.2
1 For example: “Foot and mouth payments are too high” www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/aug/07/politics.
footandmouth.
2 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to these limitations in the analysis to
follow, and for suggesting their inclusion in the discussion of the paper’s policy implications.
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This model is then subjected to a numerical analysis in Sect. 2, which evaluates the role of
a range of policy and other parameters of the farmer’s decision environment in determining
the scope for animal health agencies to use compensation payments to provide appropriate
incentives both for the implementation of on-farm biosecurity and for compliance behaviour
in relation to disease reporting. Note in this context that the parameter values used in the
numerical analysis are largely chosen for illustrative purposes. In particular, the NAO report
cited above points out that the UK’s Animal Health Act 1981 “requires compensation to
be based on the value of the animal immediately before it became infected”—where the
government’s interpretation of “value” “is that compensationwill be based on ‘market value”’
(NAO 2002, p. 82). Therefore, the exploration in what follows of the scope for such payments
to be varied is in effect a hypothetical consideration of cost-effectiveness options within the
context of the legal requirement for compensation to be paid as provided by the UK’s Animal
Health Act 1981.
Finally, the Conclusion provides both a brief summary and a discussion of policy impli-
cations, with particular reference to the issues of spatial heterogeneity in disease prevalence,
flexibility in the implementation of on-farm biosecurity and the contribution of the paper to
the debate over the size of compensation payments as required by UK law.
2 The Model
The incentive effects of compensation payments in the context of animal disease have pre-
viously been analysed by Gramig et al. (2009) using a dynamic, stochastic capital valuation
model of on-farm decision-making while, as stated previously, Hennessy and Wolf (2015)
used a discursive, non-mathematical approach. Yet both reach the same conclusion that “By
using a single mechanism to induce biosecurity and reporting simultaneously, the incentives
for each individual private action are not clear” (Gramig et al. 2009, p. 639; see also Hennessy
and Wolf 2015, p. 10).
As a consequence, this paper takes a “middle-ground” approach in terms of analytical
complexity, with the aim of balancing the need for enough model structure to be able to
characterise the farmer’s disease management decision problems with the desire to provide
clarity both in relation to the incentive effects of compensation payments, and (therefore) in
relation to the scope for animal health agencies to use compensation payments to best effect.
It should be emphasised at this point that although the objective of the government in this
context can reasonably be thought of as one of maximising social welfare, the analysis in this
paper forms only a component of a full policy evaluation exercise. In particular, as indicated
in the Introduction, the focus of the analysis in this paper is limited to a consideration of
the cost-effectiveness of alternative policy options in relation to the level of compensation
payments. As such, it does not enable consideration of the social desirability (or not) of the
payment of such compensation—a consideration which, since these payments are required
by law, is outside the scope of this paper.3
Inwhat follows the farmer is assumed to be an expected utilitymaximiserwithin a decision
environment characterised by uncertainty about a disease outbreak. Given this uncertainty,
the farmer must make two decisions: (i) whether to incur the cost of on-farm biosecurity
measures which will reduce the likelihood of a disease outbreak; and (ii) whether to report
a disease outbreak should one take place. Note that, reflecting the actual legal position of
3 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this limitation in the scope of the paper’s analysis.
See also NAO (2002) for a consideration of the cost-effectiveness issue.
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livestock farmers in the UK, the first decision is voluntary for farmers, while the second
decision relates to a legal requirement (see NAO 2002). In addition, this decision-making
environment has a temporal feature in that information about a disease outbreak is only
revealed after the on-farm biosecurity costs are incurred (or not), and after which event the
farmer must decide whether or not to report a disease outbreak (should one have taken place).
Nevertheless, in what follows the analysis of these decisions is framed in an ex ante context
so that the farmer is evaluating four options:4
(i) Incur biosecurity costs and report any disease outbreak (BR).
(ii) Incur biosecurity costs but don’t report any disease outbreak (BNR).
(iii) Don’t incur biosecurity costs, but report any disease outbreak (NBR).
(iv) Don’t incur biosecurity costs and don’t report any disease outbreak (NBNR).
In addition, the (risk averse) farmer faces uncertainty not just in relation to the likelihood of a
disease outbreak, but also in relation to the likelihood of non-compliancewith the requirement
to report a disease outbreak being detected.5 Finally, as stated in the Introduction, the farmer’s
decision environment is closed in that that are no spillovers to future decision contexts on the
farm or to the decision contexts of other farmers. The removal of such spillovers is a major
analytical simplification, the implications of which are considered, particularly in a spatial
context, in the Conclusion to this paper.
More specifically:
(i) If the farmer’s livestock remain disease free they are assumed to have a “value” M.
(ii) If the farmer chooses to incur the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures (B) then the
likelihood of no disease outbreak is increased from q to p (i.e. p> q).
(iii) If the farmer experiences a disease outbreak and chooses to report it, then the farmer
is paid compensation of D, where 0<D<M, and is the government agency’s “single
mechanism” for providing incentives both to undertake on-farm biosecurity measures
and to report a disease outbreak.6
(iv) If the farmer experiences a disease outbreak and chooses not to report it, then the
livestock can be disposed of for a “quick sale” value of S (where S<M). In addition,
the likelihood of not being caught so doing is r, but if caught then the government agency
imposes a penalty of tD (where t>0). Note that if t=1, then this is equivalent to the
government agency imposing a fine equal to the full amount of the compensation which
4 Note that although the farmer would in practice have the option of reviewing the ex ante decision to report
or not report once the disease outbreak information was revealed, it is shown in the numerical analysis in the
next section that whichever of these decisions is preferred ex ante remains the preferred decision after the
disease outbreak information is revealed.
5 For example, bovine tuberculosis is a notifiable disease and therefore farmers have a legal requirement to
report an outbreak on their farm. Note also that Hennessy and Wolf (2015) and Gramig et al. (2009) frame
the reporting decision as “hidden in formation” and characterise this as an adverse selection problem, while
the on-farm biosecurity decision is framed as “hidden action” and characterised as a moral hazard problem.
But in my view “hidden information” can be either adverse selection (if it is legal to hide the information) or
moral hazard (if it is illegal to hide the information). Similarly, “hidden action” can be either adverse selection
(again if it is legal to hide the action) or moral hazard (again if it is illegal to hide the action). See Fraser
(2015) for a detailed discussion of these distinctions, but in what follows, because on-farm biosecurity in the
context of animal disease is not mandatory, I see this as an adverse selection problem, and because reporting a
disease outbreak is mandatory, I see this as a moral hazard problem. Finally, note the same distinction applies
in relation to tax avoidance (i.e. adverse selection) and tax evasion (i.e. moral hazard).
6 As stated in the Introduction, it should be recalled at this point that the current legal requirement in the UK is
effectively for D=M. Therefore, an analysis which considers the cost-effectiveness of D<M is hypothetical
within the context of the law.
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would have been paid if the farmer had reported the disease outbreak.7 Note also that
Hennessy and Wolf (2015) suggest “the indemnity must at least equal the amount the
farmer would receive” “to quietly market the (diseased) animals” (p. 7). This suggestion
creates the hypothesis that to achieve compliance D>S, an hypothesis which will be
evaluated in the numerical analysis of the next section.
On this basis the expected utility of net income (E(U(I))) for each of the farmer’s four options
is given by:
(i) BR:
E(U(I)) = E(U(pM + (1 − p)D − B)) (1)
(ii) BNR:
E(U(I)) = E(U(pM + (1 − p)(rS + (1 − r)(S − tD)) − B)) (2)
(iii) NBR:
E(U(I)) = E(U(qM + (1 − q)D)) (3)
(iv) NBNR:
E(U(I)) = E(U(qM + (1 − q)(rS + (1 − r)(S − tD))) (4)
The next section reports on a numerical analysis of the farmer’s choice between these
four options, with a particular focus on the potential for the value of D to be chosen by the
government agency such that option (i) (i.e. undertaking on-farm biosecurity measures and
reporting a disease outbreak) is preferred by the farmer. In addition, the numerical analysis
evaluates the role of various parameters of the farmer’s decision environment in influencing
this potential (specifically: the farmer’s attitude to risk; the (base level) likelihoodof nodisease
outbreak (q); the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures (B); the value of “quietly marketed”
diseased animals (S); and the likelihood of not being caught not reporting a disease outbreak
(r)).
However, before proceeding it should be noted that there is a particular complexity to the
farmer’s decision of whether to incur the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures which relates
to the base level of the likelihood of no disease outbreak for the farmer. More specifically,
incurring this cost (B) increases the likelihood of no disease outbreak (i.e. p>q). Given this:8
dE(I)/dq = (M − D) > 0 (5)
Therefore, for a risk neutral farmer, the decision to incur the cost of on-farm biosecurity
measures will depend on the balance between the positive impact of this action on expected
income (i.e. see Eq. 5) and the negative impact of the cost itself.
But for a risk averse farmer, this action also has an effect of the variance of income (Var(I))
where:9
Var(I) = q(M − E(I))2 + (1 − q)(D − E(I))2 (6)
7 Note that in the Gramig et al. (2009) analysis (the equivalent of) t is used as an additional policy mechanism,
so that the government agency uses “(a) indemnities to achieve desired levels of biosecurity and (b) fines that
induce disclosure of disease status” (p. 639). In what follows, only D is used to deliver these incentives, as is
consistent with current disease control policy. However, the role of varying t is considered within the context
of the sensitivity analysis in the next section.
8 From Eq. (3).
9 Recall that Var(I) = E(I−E(I))2.
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More specifically, differentiating Eq. (6) with respect to q and rearranging gives:
dVar(I)/dq = (M − D)2 (1 − 2q) (7)
which implies:
dVar(I)/dq > or < 0 as q < or > 1/2 (8)
In words, Eq. (8) implies that if the farmer is facing a relatively high base level likelihood
of a disease outbreak (i.e. q<1/2), then although incurring the cost of on-farm biosecurity
measures increases expected income by reducing this likelihood, it also increases the variance
of income in this situation. Only if the base level likelihood of a disease outbreak is relatively
low (i.e. q >1/2) does incurring the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures have an overall
risk-reducing impact. It follows that for endemic animal diseases such as bovine tuberculosis
(in the UK) which have a strong spatial variation in terms of disease prevalence, the incentive
for a farmer to undertake on-farm biosecurity measures will also have a spatial variation.
This policy issue is explored further in the numerical analysis of the next section.
3 Numerical Analysis
In order to undertake a numerical analysis of the model developed in Sect. 2 it is further
assumed that the attitude to risk of the farmer can be represented by the mean-variance
framework and the constant relative risk aversion functional form:10
E(U (I )) = U (E(I )) = 1/2.U ′′(E(I )) · Var(I ) (9)
where
U (I ) = I (1−R)/(1 − R)











Note than an advantage of using this framework is that it clearly distinguishes the expected
income and variance of income components of the incentive effects of compensation pay-
ments in determining the farmer’s decisions regarding on-farm biosecurity and disease
reporting. And as will be shown below, this simple framework also helps to clarify the
impact of changes in the parameter values of the farmer’s decision environment on the pre-
ferred choice of actions. Given this framework, the assumed model parameter values for the
Base Case are given in Table 1.
In relation to these assumed parameter values, the following points should be noted;
(a) Given the current legal requirement in the UK for D=M, in what follows the ratio
D/M will be central to the consideration of the cost-effectiveness of alternative levels of
compensation payments.
(b) The fixing of r and t, while also consistent with the current application of the com-
pensation policy in the UK, nevertheless removes further scope for, potentially socially
desirable, policy alternatives. In this context, Fraser (2002) analyses the potential for
adjusting both r and t to encourage compliance behaviour among farmers, while also
10 See Hanson and Ladd (1991) and Pope and Just (1991) for arguments supporting these assumptions.
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Table 1 Specification of the Base Case
Model parameter Description of model parameter Base Case value
M Disease free value of farmer’s livestock 100
S Disposal value of livestock from a “quick sale” 50
B Cost of on-farm biosecurity 10
q Probability of no disease outbreak without biosecurity 0.55
p Probability of no disease outbreak with biosecurity 0.75
r Probability of not being caught for non-compliance 0.9
t Non-compliance penalty rate 1
R Farmer’s attitude to risk 0.5
D Compensation paid for reporting a disease outbreak 46
Table 2 Results for the Base
Case
(i) BR (ii) BNR (iii) NBR (iv) NBNR
E(I) 76.50 76.35 75.70 75.43
Var(I) 646.75 706.58 721.71 823.54
E(U(I)) 17.25 17.21 17.13 17.06
reducingmonitoring costs.11 This issue will also be considered in the sensitivity analysis
to follow.
(c) The setting of R=0.5 is consistent with existing empirical evidence (see Newbery and
Stiglitz 1981, and Bardsley and Harris 1987).
Note also that for theBaseCase the farmer’s baseline situation is “favourable” in that a disease
outbreak is relatively unlikely (i.e. q>0.5). As a consequence, and recalling the analysis in
Sect. 2, incurring the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures will deliver both an increase in
expected income (before the cost of these measures) and a decrease in the variance of income
for the farmer. Finally, note that the “fine” for non-compliance has been set equal to the full
amount of the compensation payment (i.e. t=1). This is consistent with practice in the UK
(NAO 2002).
Table 2 provides details of the results of the numerical analysis using these Base Case
parameter values.12
These results show that, given the other parameter values in the farmer’s decision envi-
ronment, by choosing a level of compensation payment of 46 the government agency creates
a situation where the farmer’s expected income is maximised, and variance of income is
minimised, for the option where the farmer chooses both to undertake costly on-farm biose-
curity measures and to report a disease outbreak in the event that one takes place (i.e. BR).
It follows that this Base Case represents a situation where the government agency is able to
11 I am again grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the policy relevance of varying both r and t
in this context.
12 Note that while the Base Case parameter values have been chosen to deliver BR as the optimal decision, as
will be clear in the sensitivity analysis which follows, the scope for setting D to deliver this set of choices is
extremely limited. Hence, the extent to which the E(U(I)) for BR exceeds the alternatives is relatively small.
I am again grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point as this feature of the numerical analysis
has important policy implications.
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Table 3 Sensitivity with respect
to D
D (%D/M)
43 (43%) 45.2 46 50.5 52 (52%)
R=0.2 BNR BNR BR NBR NBR
R=0.5 BNR BR BR BR NBR
use the single mechanism of compensation payments to incentivise the farmer not only to
incur the private cost of reducing their likelihood of a disease outbreak, but also to choose to
comply with their disease reporting requirement. Note also that this Base Case result features
D<S, which implies the compensation payment is less than the amount the farmer would
receive from “quietly marketing” their diseased animals. This contradiction of the hypoth-
esis suggested by Hennessy and Wolf (2015) can be explained by comparing the results in
columns (i) and (ii) which show that, given the farmer has chosen to incur the cost of on-farm
biosecurity measures, not only does the expected income from complying exceed that from
not complying, but also the variance of income is lower. Moreover, these differences can
be attributed to a combination of the likelihood of being caught, and the associated fine, in
modifying the farmer’s expected income and variance of income.13
Now that it has been established that the potential exists for a government agency to be
able to set the level of compensation payments to incentivise both the undertaking of on-farm
biosecurity measures and disease reporting compliance, consider next the range of values
over which this level can be successfully varied. Table 3 contains results from varying the
value of D between 43 and 52, and shows the preferred choice of actions by a farmer with
two different levels of risk aversion (i.e. R=0.2 and 0.5).14
The results in Table 3 show that if the government agency was to reduce the level of
compensation payments to 43, then both types of farmers would choose to incur the cost
of on-farm biosecurity measures, but not to report a disease outbreak (i.e. BNR). In this
case, although the next best option is BR, given the level of D, the risk of being caught not
complying and the associated fine, expected income is higher and the variance of income is
lower for BNR.15 Whereas if the government agency was to reduce the level of compensation
payment only to 45.2, then this level represents a borderline where for the less risk averse
farmer (i.e. R=0.2) the expected income advantage of on-farm biosecurity measures and not
complying (i.e. BNR) is sufficient to dominate the variance of income advantage of on-farm
biosecurity measures and complying (i.e. BR), but this is not the case for the more risk averse
farmer (i.e. R=0.5).
Similarly, if the government was to increase the level of compensation payment to 52, then
the expected income advantage of not incurring the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures,
but reporting a disease outbreak (i.e. NBR) dominates the farmer’s decision regardless of
13 Following on from the discussion in Sect. 2, in the event of a disease outbreak E(I) from complying is 46
(i.e. =D), compared with 45.2 by not complying (see Eq. 2). In addition, complying is a riskless choice for a
risk averse farmer.
14 Note that the values of D in this table, and in the subsequent tables, are chosen to illustrate the set of values
of D which capture changes in the optimal decision choices for the farmer. For lower and higher values of D
than contained in the tables there are no further changes in decision choices.
15 In this case also note that in the event of a disease outbreak, E(I) from complying is 43 compared with 45.7
for not complying. Moreover, not complying remains the preferred choice of action for a risk averse farmer
even after a disease outbreak is revealed because this expected income difference dominates the higher risk
associated with this choice.
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Table 4 Sensitivity with respect
to B
D (%D/M)
43 (43%) 45.2 46 60.3 61 (61%)
B=8
R=0.5 BNR BR BR BR NBR
B=12
R=0.5 NBNR NBR NBR NBR NBR
the level of risk aversion. However, if this increase was only to the level of 50.5, then while
the expected income advantage of NBR dominates for the less risk averse farmer, for the
more risk averse farmer the variance of income advantage of on-farm biosecurity measures
dominates overall and BR is preferred.
It follows from the results in Table 3 that for the Base Case parameter values the “win-
dow” open to the government agency for setting a level of compensation payments which
incentivises both on-farm biosecurity and disease reporting compliance ranges between 45.2
and 50.5 (i.e. between 45.2 and 50.5% of the “market value” M)—and where this “window”
is smaller for less risk averse farmers, and larger for more risk averse farmers. Moreover,
for levels of compensation payments above this range the farmer is not incentivised to incur
the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures, while for levels of compensation payments below
this range the farmer is not incentivised to comply with their disease reporting requirements.
Given that the legal requirement in the UK is effectively for D=M, it is clear from Table 3
both that this level of compensation payment means that farmers have no incentive to volun-
tarily implement (costly) on-farm biosecurity, and that (hypothetically) substantial increases
in cost-effectiveness could therefore be achieved by reducing the level of compensation paid
below “market value”.
Next, consider the impact of variations in theBaseCase parameter values on the size of this
“window” of levels of compensation payments which incentivise both on-farm biosecurity
and disease reporting compliance. First Table 4 contains details of the results for a decrease
and an increase in the Base Case cost of on-farm biosecurity measures (i.e. B=8 and 12).16
The results in Table 4 show that if the cost of on-farm biosecuritymeasures is reduced from
the Base Case level (i.e. to B=8), then the “window” of levels of compensation payments
available to the government agency increases considerably from between 45.2 and 50.5 to
between 45.2 and 60.3, at which point the farmer prefers not to incur the cost of on-farm
biosecurity measures. Whereas if the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures is increased from
its Base Case value (i.e. to B=12) then this “window” disappears completely in that at
no level of compensation payments is incurring the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures
worthwhile. In this case, as the results in Table 4 show, the only changes in farmer choice as
D is varied relate to whether or not to comply with the disease reporting requirement.
Second, Table 5 contains details of the results for a decrease and an increase in the Base
Case value from a “quick sale” of diseased animals (i.e. the value of S), rather than reporting
a disease outbreak.
The results in Table 5 show that if the value of “quietly marketing” diseased animals is
decreased (i.e. to S=45) then the “window” of levels of compensation payments available
to the government agency increases from between 45.2 and 50.5 to between 40.7 and 50.5,
16 Note that increasing and decreasing the gap between p and q delivered by on-farm biosecurity measures




Table 5 Sensitivity with respect
to S
D (%D/M)
40 (40%) 40.7 46 49.6 50.5 52 (52%)
S=45
R=0.5 BNR BR BR BR BR NBR
S=55
R=0.5 BNR BNR BNR BR BR NBR
Table 6 Sensitivity with respect
to r
D (%D/M)
40 (40%) 43.1 44 47.4 50.5 52 (52%)
r=0.85
R=0.5 BNR BR BR BR BR NBR
r=0.95
R=0.5 BNR BNR BNR BR BR NBR
reflecting the associated decreased attraction of not complying with the disease reporting
requirement. However, if the value of “quietly marketing” diseased animals is increased (i.e.
to S=55) then the associated increased attraction of not complying results in a decrease in
the “window” to between 49.6 and 50.5 (Hennessy and Wolf 2015).
It follows that, while a lower cost of on-farm biosecurity measures and a lower value for
“quietly marketed” diseased animals enhances the scope for a government agency to set the
level of compensation payments to incentivise both on-farm biosecurity and disease reporting
compliance, increases in these values can reduce or even eliminate this scope.
A similar finding applies in the case of variations in the likelihood of being caught not
complying (i.e. r), as reported in Table 6.17
In this case, decreasing the likelihood of not being caught (to r=0.85) increases the attrac-
tion of complying and so the “window” is increased from between 45.2 and 50.5 to between
43.1 and 50.5, while increasing the likelihood of not being caught (to r=0.95) decreases the
“window” to between 47.4 and 50.5. In this case it is clear that more comprehensive monitor-
ing of disease reporting compliance by a government agency will increase the range of levels
of compensation payments which incentivise farmers both to comply with disease reporting
requirements and to undertake on-farm biosecurity measures, although more comprehensive
monitoring could also be expected to be more costly.18
Finally in this section, consider the issue raised in Sect. 2 of the impact of the farmer’s
base level of likelihood of no disease outbreak on the incentive to incur the cost of on-farm
biosecurity measures, and therefore on the scope for a level of compensation payments which
incentivises both on-farm biosecurity and disease reporting compliance. For the Base Case
this likelihood was assumed to be relatively high with q=0.55. Now consider the situation
where a disease outbreak is instead relatively likely, with q=0.25 (and p=0.45).
17 Note that increasing and decreasing the fine for non-compliance (i.e. t) has similar effects on the “window”
to those of decreasing and increasing r, so these results are not provided here.However, asmentionedpreviously,
varying both r and t represents a potentially more socially desirable policy alternative. See Fraser (2002).
18 Once again I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this cost implication of decreasing r.
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Table 7 Sensitivity with respect
to q
D (%D/M)
44 (44%) 45 45.3 46 47.8 48 (48%)
q=0.25
R=0.2 BNR BNR BR BR BR NBR
R=0.5 NBNR NBR NBR NBR NBR NBR
It was observed in Sect. 2 that in this case undertaking on-farm biosecurity measures has
a positive impact on expected income (before cost) but, unlike for the Base Case, it also
has a negative impact through increasing the variance of income. As a consequence, it was
expected that such an increase in the base level disease likelihood would discourage farmers
from undertaking on-farm biosecurity measures, and this expectation is confirmed by the
results in Table 7.
More specifically, this negative impact of on-farm biosecurity measures on the variance
of incomemeans that the “window” is completely eliminated for the more risk averse farmer,
and diminishes to between 45.3 and 47.8 for the less risk averse farmer. It follows that if the
spatial distribution of an endemic animal disease creates such variations in the base level of
likelihood of a disease outbreak between farmers in different regions, then the government
agency faces a more complicated problem of incentivising these differently situated farmers
to undertake on-farm biosecurity measures, and so the “single mechanism” option may not
apply in this spatial context.19
4 Conclusion
This paper has examined the issue of compensation payments for farmers affected by an
animal disease outbreak, and their role in incentivising farmers both to undertake costly on-
farm biosecurity measures and to comply with disease reporting requirements. The paper was
itself incentivised both by the observation of Hennessy and Wolf (2015) that “compensation
must be sufficient to encourage early reporting but not so large as to discourage appropriate
levels of biosecurity effort” (p. 1), and by their subsequent conclusion that “a single one-size-
fits-all indemnity payment could not deal with both problems” (p. 9)—a conclusion which
they noted was at odds with practice whereby “Animal health authorities have relied on a
single mechanism—indemnities—to facilitate both ex ante biosecurity efforts and ex post
reporting” (p. 10).
As a consequence, the aim of this paper was to develop a simple model of farmer decision-
making in the presence of the threat of animal disease with a view to throwing some light
on this conflict between the practice of animal health authorities and the conclusions of the
existing literature regarding the scope for the “single mechanism” of compensation payments
to incentivise farmers both to undertake on-farm biosecurity and to comply with disease
reporting requirements.
Thismodelwasdeveloped inSect. 2 and then subjected to a numerical analysis inSect. 3 for
the purpose of illustrating the scope for compensation payments to create this dual incentive-
compatible decision-making environment for farmers. This numerical analysis also included
19 See Hennessy and Wolf (2015) and associated references, particularly by David Hennessy, for further
discussion of this spatial heterogeneity problem in disease management policy.
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an evaluation of the role of a set of policy and other parameter values in determining the
extent to which a government agency could successfully incentivise both farmer actions of
on-farm biosecurity and disease reporting compliance.
The findings of this numerical analysis included a demonstration that the potential existed
for a range of levels of compensation payments to incentivise both farmer actions. Moreover,
this range of levels could be influenced in the following ways by the value of parameters in
the farmer’s decision environment:
(i) The range is larger (smaller) for more (less) risk averse farmers
(ii) The range is larger (smaller) for less (more) costly on-farm biosecurity measures
(iii) The range is larger (smaller) for lower (higher) values for the “quick sale” of (unreported)
diseased animals
(iv) The range is larger (smaller) for higher (lower) likelihoodof being caught not complying.
Finally, across all the sensitivity analysis of parameter values this range of levels was confined
to between 40 and 60% of the “market value” of animals.
In relation to the policy implications of this analysis, putting to one side the undeniable
arbitrariness of most of the parameter values and instead focussing on the results relating
to the ratio of compensation payments to “market value”, it would seem that the current
UK legal requirement for paying farmers compensation which is the equivalent of “market
value” is almost certainly destructive of the incentive to invest voluntarily, and to any extent,
in costly on-farm biosecurity. As a consequence, it can be concluded that the potential exists
for considerable improvements in the cost-effectiveness of this policy by reducing the level
of compensation payments below “market value”.
In addition, consideration was given in both Sects. 2 and 3 to the issue of differences
among farmers in the base line likelihood of a disease outbreak, such as would arise if an
endemic animal disease had spatially differentiated levels of disease prevalence. In this case
it was shown that a relatively high base line likelihood of a disease outbreak discouraged
farmers from incurring the cost of on-farm biosecurity measures because such an action
was risk-increasing. As a consequence, there may be no level of compensation payments
which incentivises such farmers both to comply with disease reporting requirements and to
undertake on-farm biosecurity, thereby casting doubt on the viability of the “single mecha-
nism” of compensation payments to incentivise both farmer actions. However, in this case
the appropriate policy response would seem to be not to discard the “single mechanism” of
compensation payments, but rather to supplement it with region-specific subsidies towards
the cost of undertaking on-farm biosecurity measures which apply in those areas with high
disease prevalence.20
Finally, the approach in this paper of the government only choosing one policy parameter
(the level of compensation payments) and fixing the other two policy parameters (the proba-
bility of being monitored for compliance with disease reporting and the penalty if caught not
complying), while consistent with current policy practice in the UK, is clearly inadequate in
the context of a complete evaluation of the socially desirable policy approach. Therefore, a
further implication is for the need to review the current policy approach in the light of these
limitations.
As a consequence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the existing practice of using the
“single mechanism” of compensation payments to incentivise farmers both to undertake on-
farmbiosecurity and to complywith disease reporting requirements does have some analytical
20 Note in relation to the results reported in Table 7, that if the cost of B in this case was “subsidised” from 10
down to 8, then the range of levels compensation payments which incentivise both on-farm biosecurity and
disease reporting compliance is expanded from being non-existent to between 45 and 56.8 for R=0.5.
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support, albeit in a relatively simple theoretical framework, even if it also is clearly in need of
further analysis with a view to evaluating both its cost-effectiveness and its social desirability.
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